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The increasing digitization of content has created numerous 
challenges to copyright enforcement over the last two decades, as 
copies became near-perfect and infringement became easy and 
inexpensive.1  The spread of digital content shares a symbiotic 
relationship with the growth and development of the Internet as a 
tool for communication and commerce.  Innovations in digitization 
technology have been spurred by the desire for efficient and high-
quality methods of transmitting content via the Internet.  This 
technology has evolved as Internet transmission technologies have 
 
A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexxi/book2.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
*  LL.M. in Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, Fordham 
University School of Law, 2010; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2005; 
A.B., Princeton University, 2002. 
 1 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 52–62 (Princeton Univ. Press 2009) (discussing the development and 
implications of digitization). 
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improved, allowing more datathus larger and higher-quality 
content files—to speed around the globe.2 
In particular, the last several years have seen the growth of 
“cloud computing,” allowing users to employ a variety of 
protocols, applications, and transmission techniques to store data 
and to harness the processing power of remote servers, often 
controlled by third-party providers.3  The development of cloud 
computing, heralded by more-expansive and less-expensive 
broadband Internet connections, is poised to add a new challenge 
to copyright enforcement as more users take to the cloud to store, 
transmit, manipulate, and share content. 
This Article will identify likely problem areas for copyright 
enforcement arising from this technological trend and, through an 
analysis of recent copyright jurisprudence involving cloud 
computing, describe the present and near-term viability of 
copyright enforcement in the cloud.4  Part I will focus on cloud 
computing: what the term comprises and what its design and 
implementation suggest about the viability of copyright 
enforcement, including challenges posed by different types of 
cloud computing.  Part II will set out the framework of copyright 
law relevant to this issue.  Part III will review some recent cases 
involving copyright and different types or aspects of cloud 
computing to analyze the near-term viability of enforcement in the 
cloud. 
I. DEFINING “CLOUD COMPUTING” 
Cloud computing refers to a set of approaches to diffuse 
computing power across more than one physical computer.5  These 
approaches are generally divided into three categories: 
 
 2 Id. at 80 (describing the rapid development and deployment of global high-speed 
data networks). 
 3 See infra Part I. 
 4 This Article will not discuss user liability or the viability of enforcement against 
individual infringers.  
 5 See Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., INFO. TECH. LAB. (Oct. 7, 2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/ 
groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-def-v15.doc [hereinafter NIST Definition]. 
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Infrastructure-as-a-Service (“IaaS”), Platform-as-a-Service 
(“PaaS”), and Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”).6  Nearly all 
computer users today, and an even greater portion of Internet users, 
utilize some method of cloud computing in their day-to-day 
activities.7  To illustrate this point, the top five websites by visits, 
accounting for nearly one-quarter of all website visits in a given 
week, consist of two search engines/portals and three sites that can 
readily be considered examples of SaaS cloud computing: 
Facebook, the social networking site and number one website by 
traffic; Yahoo! Mail, the number one webmail provider by 
accounts; and YouTube, a video sharing site that will be discussed 
in more detail below.8 
By contrast, a user with no presence “in the cloud” would be 
restricted to use only software found on her own computer, use e-
mail, if at all, that is hosted and operated on servers that she 
controls, and eschew any interactive Internet sites, including all 
social networking sites.9  While there are certainly those who 
operate in this framework, it is neither the norm in practice nor the 
prevailing business model in the computing or broader technology 
markets.10  This comparison implicitly identifies why cloud 
 
 6 Id. 
 7 John Horrigan, Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Services, PEW INTERNET 
(Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.pewInternet.org/Reports/2008/Use-of-Cloud-Computing-
Applications-and-Services.aspx.  
 8 Top 20 Sites & Engines, EXPERIAN HITWISE, http://www.hitwise.com/us/ 
datacenter/main/dashboard-10133.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
 9 Pat Bitton, Tech Beat: Cloud Computing—What Is It, and Why Should You Care?, 
TIMES-STANDARD, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.times-standard.com/business/ci_16286491 
(“If you’re using applications like Google Mail or Salesforce.com, you’re already using 
cloud computing.”); Michael Otey, The Rise of Cloud Computing, WINDOWSITPRO (Apr. 
26, 2010), http://www.windowsitpro.com/article/cloud-computing2/The-Rise-of-Cloud-
Computing/2.aspx (“Cloud-based services such as Gmail and Hotmail have been in 
widespread use for years.  Social-media sites such as Facebook and MySpace are also 
cloud-based services that millions of consumers have adopted and even take for 
granted.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Brad Stone & Ashlee Vance, Companies Slowly Join Cloud-Computing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/technology/ 
19cloud.html (describing the gradual adoption of cloud computing by companies in 
several industry sectors). 
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computing has been described as a new avenue of competition for 
the major players in the computer industry, such as Microsoft.11 
Cloud computing relies on the technology of virtualization, 
which allows an application to create and manage non-permanent, 
virtual (software-based) servers on physical server hardware.12  It 
is this virtualization that provides the seemingly endless elasticity 
that is essential to cloud computing: “Virtualization means that e-
mail, Web, or file servers (or anything else) can be conjured up as 
soon as they are needed; when the need is gone, they can be wiped 
from existence, freeing the host computer to run a different virtual 
machine for another user.”13  Modern cloud computing is a 
matured version of the mainframe-terminal system that was in 
vogue in the 1960s and 1970s, where companies would provide 
employees with “dumb” terminals with which to access the 
“smart” mainframe.14  The terminals would require only enough 
processing power to connect to the mainframe, where the real work 
 
 11 See William H. Page, Microsoft and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 33, 49–50 (2010) (suggesting that nascent cloud computing implementations can 
challenge established players, like Microsoft, shifting the antitrust analysis).  Page quotes 
a “florid” description of possible advantages to be found in the cloud: 
Cloud computing offers virtually unlimited, on-demand computing 
resources.  Your applications now live in a new platform—a 
computing cloud.  In the cloud, your applications take advantage of 
the seemingly limitless processor cycles, memory storage, and 
network bandwidth along with extensive software capabilities. Your 
applications only pay for what they use.  Beyond basic computing 
resources, cloud computing offers a range of application services that 
form a new platform—an Internet operating system—suitable for cost 
effective, dynamic, and Internet-scale solutions. An Internet 
operating system offers the scale and services required to meet the 
requirements of a dynamic, global, software application. 
Id. at 50 (quoting Dana Moore & John Hebeler, Computing in the Clouds, DR. DOBB’S 
(Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.drdobbs.com/architecture-and-design/213000642;jsessionid= 
UMKP$MKFRG4SNQE1GHPSKH WATM32JVN).  
 12 See Erica Naone, Conjuring Clouds: How Engineers Are Making On-Demand 
Computing a Reality, TECH. REV., Jul.–Aug. 2009, at 54, available at http:// 
www.technologyreview.com/computing/22606. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. (“‘Cloud computing is a reincarnation of the computing utility of the 1960s but is 
substantially more flexible and larger scale than the [systems] of the past,’ says Google 
executive and Internet pioneer Vint Cerf.”). 
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was done.15  Just as “time sharing” once did, modern cloud 
computing creates the illusion that a user’s individual computer is 
more powerful than it actually is.16  Today, readily-deployed 
virtualization allows this approach to computing to be employed 
dynamically on a global scale. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) 
has developed a series of definitions seeking to encompass key 
elements of the diverse field of cloud computing.17  These 
definitions, consisting of “five essential characteristics, three 
service models, and four deployment models,” provide helpful 
structure to this discussion.18  The “essential characteristics” are: 
on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, 
rapid elasticity, and measured service.19   
For the discussion of copyright enforcement in the cloud, the 
first two of these—self-service and broad network access—are the 
most important.  Briefly, broad network access suggests the basis 
of the “problem” from the perspective of copyright owners.  It is 
the characteristic that allows users to access and share their, or 
other users’, cloud-based files and systems from virtually 
anywhere with broadband connections.  Self-service speaks to the 
resulting liability questions, at the heart of this Article; namely 
whether the user or the system is committing and thereby liable for 
infringement when it occurs.  As NIST defines it, the on-demand 
self-service characteristic means that, “[a] consumer can 
unilaterally provision computing capabilities, such as server time 
and network storage, as needed automatically without requiring 
human interaction with each service’s provider.”20  The need for 
 
 15 See, e.g., Jeffrey Voas & Jia Zhang, Cloud Computing: New Wine or Just a New 
Bottle?, ITPRO, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 15, available at http://www.cs.pitt.edu/ 
~ezegarra/Grid_computing/papers/Cloud%20Computing%20New%20Wine%20or%20 
Just%20a%20New%20Bottle.pdf (“In Phase 1, people used terminals to connect to 
powerful mainframes shared by many users.  Back then, terminals were basically little 
more than keyboards and monitors.”).  
 16 See, e.g., NELL DALE & JOHN LEWIS, COMPUTER SCIENCE ILLUMINATED 328 (2006) 
(describing mainframe time-sharing). 
 17 See NIST Definition, supra note 5. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 NIST Definition, supra note 5 (emphasis added). 
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human oversight, or lack thereof, on the provider side can play a 
key role in the analysis of provider liability, as will be discussed 
more fully below.21  While the Copyright Act is generally 
understood to be and is applied as a strict liability statute,22 courts 
have found a distinction in recent years where the defendant’s 
system is automatically making the potentially infringing copies.23  
The “self-service” characteristic of cloud computing speaks to this 
very question of volitional conduct. 
Recent case law has increasingly suggested that copies created 
as a result of user conduct and choice will generally not devolve 
liability to the service provider, even where the system making the 
copies was created and is owned and maintained by a service 
provider.24  Certainly the NIST definition cannot answer the 
question in a given scenario of whether a system was making 
copies at a user’s behest, but the existence of the definition, as a 
guideline to system operators and developers, can serve to bolster 
 
 21 See infra notes 190–200 and accompanying text. 
 22 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 
1963) (“While there have been some complaints concerning the harshness of the principle 
of strict liability in copyright law, courts have consistently refused to honor the defense 
of absence of knowledge or intention.” (citation omitted)); Sony/ATV Music Publ’g LLC 
v. CAVS USA, Inc., No. 3:08-0265, 2009 WL 2177110, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. July 21, 
2009) (“[C]opyright infringement is a strict liability offense in the sense that it does not 
require that Plaintiffs demonstrate Defendants’ intent to infringe, or even knowledge of 
the infringement.”).    
 23 See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of 
reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that 
causes the copy to be made.” (discussing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995))); see also CoStar Grp., Inc. v. 
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004) (“While the court in Netcom did point 
out the dramatic consequences of a decision that would hold ISPs strictly liable for 
transmitting copyrighted materials through their systems without knowledge of what was 
being transmitted, the court grounded its ruling principally on its interpretation of § 106 
of the Copyright Act as implying a requirement of ‘volition or causation’ by the 
purported infringer.  This construction is one for which we have already indicated our 
preference over the contrary decision described in [Playboy].” (comparing Netcom with 
Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993))); Parker v. Yahoo!, Inc., 
No. 2:07-cv-02757-MAM, 2008 WL 4410095, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2008) 
(“Although copyright infringement generally operates under a theory of strict liability, 
various courts have required an additional element of ‘volition or causation’ to find direct 
infringement.”).   
 24 See infra notes 190–200 and accompanying text. 
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an argument along these lines, potentially allowing the service 
provider to avoid liability. 
The “broad network access” characteristic stresses network 
availability and the ability of the consumer to access the data or 
service through a variety of client platforms, including “mobile 
phones, laptops, and PDAs [personal digital assistants].”25  The 
ability to broadly view and distribute content is at the heart of the 
copyright enforcement problem online, so its place on the list of 
essential characteristics makes clear the relevance of this 
discussion to ongoing enforcement efforts.  Pre-digitization, 
copyright enforcement was still difficult, but usually due to lack of 
scale: individual bootleggers selling a small quantity of a limited 
selection of copied material.26  Now, users want and expect all 
content to be accessible everywhere, all the time.27  Though this 
Article is not addressing the issue of individual infringers, 
ubiquitous, high-speed connectivity has been a boon for this type 
of scofflaw.28  As to our focus, legitimate, law-abiding users are 
rarely concerned with whether and how a back-end system makes 
copies of copyrighted content to ensure the broad access that they 
demand.  Broad network access also involves more parties in the 
transmission of data, increasing the number of Internet service 
providers and other intermediaries who must handle and pass along 
the data, potentially creating automatic, short-lived (or other) 
copies as part of the process.29 
The approaches listed earlier—IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS—are 
referred to in the NIST definition as the three “service models.”30  
Software-as-a-Service is the model with which most people are 
 
 25 NIST Definition, supra note 5. 
 26 See, e.g., Brett Lunceford & Shane Lunceford, Meh. The Irrelevance of Copyright in 
the Public Mind, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 33 (describing pre-digital examples of 
copyright infringement). 
 27 See, e.g., TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE AT SUPERCOMM 2009, FUTURE VISION OF 
MOBILE BROADBAND 12 (Oct. 21–22, 2009), http://www.atis.org/supercomm/ 
Presentations/LTE%20Track/Future%20Vision%20of% 20Mobile%20Broadband.pdf. 
 28 See, e.g., William F. Adkinson, Jr., Liability of P2P File-Sharing Systems for 
Copyright Infringement by their Users, PERIODIC COMMENTS. ON THE POLICY DEBATE, 4–
5 (2004), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop11.7p2psystems.pdf. 
 29 DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE 87 n.3 (2009) (describing the 
process by which ISPs relay messages across the Internet). 
 30 NIST Definition, supra note 5. 
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likely familiar.  The most common example is web-based e-mail, 
where the consumer is using the provider’s infrastructure and 
application, with perhaps a limited ability to specify user 
preferences.  Social networking sites—Facebook, LinkedIn, and 
others—function similarly, to the extent users are inputting and 
uploading content and making connections via the sites’ respective 
interfaces.  Even the now-taken-for-granted act of shopping online 
involves some interaction with SaaS cloud computing when the 
consumer enters her credit card number and the provider’s server-
side software, often controlled by a third party to the transaction, 
processes the order information.  Given the “closed sandbox” 
nature of most SaaS applications (meaning that users’ options and 
their ability to modify the application are strictly limited) copyright 
owners could argue that SaaS operators have a greater ability—and 
thus a greater duty—to police infringement on their systems.  This 
will be discussed more below. 
Platform-as-a-Service describes a system where the user can 
deploy her own applications, “created using programming 
languages and tools supported by the provider.”31  However, the 
consumer’s control is limited to those applications and perhaps 
some control of the hosting environment configurations.32  In this 
model, the consumer may benefit from the greater processing 
power or storage capacity of the provider’s system, or may need 
access to the rapid elasticity listed as an essential characteristic 
above.  Infrastructure-as-a-Service takes the Platform-as-a-Service 
model a step further and gives the user control over all 
fundamental computing resources, down to “operating systems, 
storage, deployed applications, and possibly limited control of 
select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).”33  Engaging 
with an IaaS provider is equivalent to outsourcing a user’s full data 
center needs, retaining the ability to access the center’s operations 
via the Internet. 
Both PaaS and IaaS involve primarily the dedication of 
physical resources—servers, network connections, etc.—so the 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 See id.  
 33 See id. 
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level of control remaining with the cloud service provider is 
arguably lower than is found in SaaS.  While copyright owners 
could demand that service providers police these systems, PaaS 
and IaaS providers could counter that argument by explaining that 
to inspect every byte that crosses a user’s virtual server would 
cripple a predominantly legitimate business.34  For example, 
Amazon.com, with its Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) and Elastic 
Cloud Compute (“EC2”) products, among others, is one of the 
largest providers of IaaS cloud computing services.35  One of its 
featured case studies is Sorenson Media, “a provider of video 
solutions.”36  Amazon, as a provider of cloud computing services 
to Sorenson Media, would likely argue that it would be 
unreasonable to put it in the position of policing for copyright 
infringement the readily scalable server space that Sorenson 
provisions.  Such server space includes storage, database servers, 
application servers and a content delivery network.37 
NIST also describes four deployment models, detailing how 
cloud infrastructure can be operated and made available: private 
cloud, community cloud, public cloud, and hybrid cloud.38  All 
four may be managed by third-party providers, but the availability 
of the infrastructure of private and community clouds is limited to 
a certain set of users: either a single organization (private) or a 
group of organizations (community).39  A public cloud’s 
infrastructure is made available to the general public and is owned 
 
 34 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984) (applying patent law’s “substantial noninfringing use” standard to copyright). 
 35 What Is AWS?, AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/what-is-aws (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2010).  
 36 AWS Case Study: Sorenson Media, AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/ 
solutions/case-studies/sorenson-media (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).  
 37 Id. (“Today, the Sorenson 360 Video Delivery Network service is architected 
entirely on top of Amazon Web Services—including Amazon EC2, Amazon S3 and 
Amazon CloudFront. [Sorenson’s Vice President of Engineering, Charles] Sismondo 
explains, ‘At the most simple level, when a customer uploads a video it hits our EC2 app 
servers, creating a database entry, sitting inside an S3 bucket and then pushed to the 
cloud for Cloudfront deployment and consumption . . . . We’ve also added a service layer 
that includes UltraDNS, Scalr and Pingdom to facilitate optimum interaction, uptime and 
availability of these services.’”). 
 38 NIST Definition, supra note 5. 
 39 See id.  
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by a company selling cloud services.  A hybrid cloud combines 
two or more of these deployment models. Each model raises 
challenges for copyright enforcement, though private and 
community clouds somewhat mitigate the problem of identifying 
the primary infringer, which plagues enforcement on the open 
Internet.40 
II. COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE CLOUD 
Before further examining how cloud computing poses specific, 
and perhaps new or modified, challenges to copyright enforcement, 
this article now clarifies which elements of copyright law are under 
discussion.  As noted above, this Article will not address the issue 
of copyright infringement by individual users, but rather will focus 
on the question of enforcement as regards network intermediaries: 
Internet service providers and site and service operators, who 
generally fall under the statutory definition of providers of 
“interactive computer service[s]”41 or online service providers 
(“OSPs”).42  While this distinction will shift our focus towards 
secondary liability more than primary liability for infringement, 
both types of liability will be discussed below.43 
A. Identifying Infringement 
Copyright in the digital age faced initial challenges in defining 
what constituted copying, given the potentially transient nature of 
 
 40 See id.  
 41 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’ 
means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a 
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”). 
 42 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (“the term ‘service provider’ means an entity offering the 
transmission, routing or providing of connections for digital online communications, 
between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without 
modification of the content of the material as sent or received.”). 
 43 Additionally, this Article will not discuss the first prong of copyright infringement 
analysis—whether the plaintiff owns a valid copyright for the work in question—as this 
is often assumed or uncontested in cases such as those discussed herein, and, even when 
contested, is part of the analysis regardless of the medium or method of the alleged 
infringement. 
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digitally stored content, compared to analog or hard-copy storage.  
Around the time that the Internet was becoming available to the 
public, the Ninth Circuit decided MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc.,44 a key case in digital copyright jurisprudence.  
MAI Systems addressed the question of whether RAM copies of 
computer software, created automatically by the software so that it 
could be run, constitute copying for the purposes of copyright 
infringement.45  Peak was in the business of servicing computer 
systems, and MAI computers accounted for more than half of 
Peak’s business.46 
The Ninth Circuit, reviewing the district court’s grant of an 
injunction against defendant Peak, looked to the definitions found 
in the Copyright Act.47  The Copyright Act defines “copies” as:  
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which 
a work is fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the work can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.48 
 The Copyright Act then explains:  
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of 
expression when its embodiment in a copy or 
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the 
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit 
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.49 
Peak contested the district court’s finding that the copies of 
MAI software that were created in the computers’ memory 
(“RAM”) while Peak was servicing MAI computers were “fixed,” 
as defined in the Copyright Act.50  Both the district court and the 
 
 44 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 45 Id. at 517. 
 46 Id. at 513. 
 47 Id. at 517–18 (citations omitted); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
48  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
49  Id. 
 50 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).  
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Ninth Circuit, however, held that the copy created in RAM 
satisfied the statutory definition of an impermissible copy.51  
Neither court fully engaged the question of what constitutes a 
“period of more than transitory duration,”52 which is a key 
question for digital and online copyright enforcement, and is a 
point with which later courts have taken issue.53 
The MAI Systems view of copying in the digital world was 
applied to the online world two years later in Religious Technology 
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.54  
Notably, MAI Systems, as a Ninth Circuit decision, was binding 
precedent on the Netcom court in California,55 but it was also the 
dominant pronouncement at the time on the construction of 
copyright law as applied to computers and digital technology.  In 
Netcom, owners of copyrights in the works of L. Ron Hubbard, 
science-fiction writer and founder of the Church of Scientology, 
sought a judgment of infringement against a former minister of 
Scientology, Dennis Erlich, who was posting materials to the 
alt.religion.scientology (“a.r.s.”) Usenet newsgroup; the owner of 
the bulletin board system (“BBS”) that hosted a.r.s., to which the 
minister was posting portions of the copyrighted works; and the 
Internet service providers used by the BBS operator to make his 
system accessible to Internet users.56 
Relying on MAI Systems, the Netcom court held that, “there is 
no question . . . that ‘copies’ were created, as Erlich’s act of 
sending a message to a.r.s. caused reproductions of portions of 
plaintiffs’ works on both [BBS operator] Klemesrud’s and [ISP] 
Netcom’s storage devices.”57  Here, the issue was not whether the 
copies were sufficiently fixed—the court held that: “Even though 
the messages remained on their systems for at most eleven days, 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id.  
 53 See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 
2008) (discussing and distinguishing the MAI Systems court’s analysis of the “fixation” 
issue). 
 54 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“This case concerns an issue of first 
impression regarding intellectual property rights in cyberspace.”). 
 55 Id. at 1368. 
 56 Id. at 1365–66. 
 57 Id. at 1368. 
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they were sufficiently ‘fixed’ to constitute recognizable copies 
under the Copyright Act”58—but rather whether the BBS and ISP 
were liable for the mere presence of copies “automatically made on 
their computers using their software as part of a process initiated 
by a third party.”59 
The court declined to adopt the plaintiffs’ argument advocating 
liability for direct infringement on the part of the BBS and ISP: 
“[I]t does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the 
liability of countless parties whose role in the infringement is 
nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is 
necessary for the functioning of the Internet.”60  The court took a 
kinder view of the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding secondary 
liability, both contributory and vicarious.  Contributory “[l]iability 
for participation in the infringement will be established where the 
defendant, ‘with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, 
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another.’”61  The court allowed for the possibility that the ISP 
could be liable for contributory infringement if the plaintiffs could 
prove that the ISP had timely knowledge of the infringement.62 
The court also found that the plaintiffs had raised a genuine 
issue of fact in the first prong of the vicarious liability test: whether 
the defendant “has the right and ability to control the infringer’s 
acts.”63  The dispute here concerned Netcom’s alleged ability, or 
professed inability, to screen messages or curtail user activity in a 
sufficiently precise fashion so that such policing would only affect 
users violating Netcom’s terms of use, which prohibited copyright 
infringement.64  However, the court held that Netcom, as a fixed-
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. at 1372. 
 61 Id. at 1373 (citation omitted). 
 62 Id. at 1374–75.  The court did not reach the ultimate question of whether Netcom 
had knowledge of the infringement since the issue was before the court on motions for 
summary judgment.  The court concluded that, “there may be a question of fact as to 
whether Netcom knew or should have known that such activities were infringing,” and 
when it gained that knowledge. Id. 
 63 Id. at 1375. 
 64 Id. at 1375–76.  As with the issue of Netcom’s knowledge under the contributory 
liability test, the court here was limited in its ability to reach the ultimate question 
because the matter was before the court on motions for summary judgment. 
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fee service provider, failed to satisfy the second prong of the 
vicarious liability test because it did not enjoy a direct financial 
benefit from Erlich’s infringement.65 
The secondary liability tests discussed in Netcom set the stage 
for much of the online copyright enforcement jurisprudence that 
followed, and will be essential to our analysis of the copyright 
enforcement challenges posed by cloud computing as ISPs and 
other interactive computer systems providers become ever more 
important to the day-to-day operations of computing at all levels.  
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,66 the court held a defendant 
BBS operator directly liable for violating the plaintiff’s exclusive 
rights “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the 
public” and “in the case of . . . pictorial . . . works . . . to display 
the copyrighted work publicly,”67 even though the defendant 
contended that he did not upload any of the infringing images to 
the system himself and did not necessarily know that they were 
available via his BBS.68  Regarding the defendant’s knowledge of 
the direct infringement, the court held that “[i]ntent to infringe is 
not needed to find copyright infringement.  Intent or knowledge is 
not an element of infringement, and thus even an innocent 
infringer is liable for infringement . . . .”69 
Relying on this language, the Netcom plaintiffs argued that 
Netcom, too, should be held liable for direct infringement despite 
its purported lack of knowledge.70  However, the Netcom court 
held that the intent or knowledge rule stated in Playboy was 
limited to allegations of direct infringement of the distribution 
right, “where liability exists regardless of whether the defendant 
makes copies.”71  The Netcom plaintiffs only indirectly alleged a 
violation of their distribution rights, found in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), 
that the court chose briefly to address.72  The court held that 
 
 65 Id. at 1376–77. 
 66 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 67 See id. at 1555 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (5) (2006)). 
 68 Id. at 1559. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 
1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1370–71. 
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Playboy was “factually distinguishable” on this point because 
Netcom did not store files for distribution.73  It concluded that:  
[f]inding such a service liable would involve an 
unreasonably broad construction of public 
distribution and display rights.  No purpose would 
be served by holding liable those who have no 
ability to control the information to which their 
subscribers have access, even though they might be 
in some sense helping to achieve the Internet's 
automatic “public distribution” and the users’ 
“public” display of files.74   
The § 106(3) claim reappeared in later plaintiffs’ allegations, 
but ultimately was superseded by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act,75 (“DMCA”) which “ruled out [liability] for 
passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process 
initiated by another . . .” thus “codif[ying] the result in . . . 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services, Inc.”76 
B. Fair Use 
After defining the relevant terms and enumerating the bundle 
of rights conferred by ownership of a valid copyright, the 
Copyright Act lists a number of limitations and definitions of 
scope: cases where infringement can be proven, but in which the 
defendant will not be liable under the Act.77  For the purposes of 
this discussion, the “fair use” exception found in 17 U.S.C. § 107 
is the most relevant of these limitations, because it exempts 
apparent instances of infringement from being the basis for 
 
73  Id. at 1372. 
74  Id. 
 75 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).  The 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act also ruled out future MAI Systems-type claims.  Title 
III, Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, amended 17 U.S.C. § 117 to 
enable those repairing computers to make certain temporary, limited copies while 
working on a computer.  See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006). 
 76 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995)). 
 77 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22. 
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liability.  The section defines the exception in arguably broad 
terms: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . , for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is 
not an infringement of copyright.  In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.78 
Both the purposes and factors enumerated in the statute have 
been judicially construed as illustrative and advisory, rather than 
exhaustive.  “Section 107 contemplates that the question of 
whether a given use of copyrighted material is ‘fair’ requires a 
case-by-case analysis in which the statutory factors are not ‘treated 
in isolation’ but are ‘weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright.’”79  For example, while quoting from a book for the 
purposes of a book review will generally be found to be a fair use 
of copyrighted material, publishing a lengthy quote from the most 
interesting part of a new, not-yet-released book probably will not.80 
Though a commercial purpose, as contemplated by the first 
factor, weighs against a finding of fair use, such a determination is 
not dispositive.  In analyzing whether a use can claim protection 
behind § 107, courts have looked to whether the challenged use is 
 
 78 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 79 A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
 80 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 539–40 
(1985). 
C04_MELZER_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2011  5:27 PM 
2011] COPYRIGHT IN THE CLOUD 419 
“transformative,” a concept triumphed by District Court Judge 
Pierre Leval in his highly-influential81 1990 article: 
I believe the answer to the question of justification 
turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the 
challenged use is transformative.  The use must be 
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a 
different manner or for a different purpose from the 
original.  A quotation of copyrighted material that 
merely repackages or republishes the original is 
unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story’s words, it 
would merely “supersede the objects” of the 
original.  If, on the other hand, the secondary use 
adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is 
used as raw material, transformed in the creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings—this is the very type of activity that 
the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the 
enrichment of society.82 
This idea has particular traction in the digital world, where all 
content can ultimately be reduced to bytes and the word 
“transformative” takes on a uniquely technological flair.83 
Importantly, however, fair use operates only at the periphery of 
copyright enforcement in the cloud because it is an exception to 
the primary act of infringement, not a separate defense against 
allegations of secondary infringement.  Accordingly, the 
intermediaries primarily discussed herein cannot make use of the 
fair use defense, except to the extent that they are confronted with 
direct infringement claims in addition to claims for secondary 
 
 81 Ben Sheffner, Sony v. Tenenbaum: There Are Limits to Fair Use Defense in 
Copyright Infringement Cases, 18 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. No. 25 (Oct. 9, 2009), available 
at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalopinionletter/100909Sheffner_LOL.pdf. 
 82 Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (1990). 
 83 See, e.g., iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 640 (holding that defendant’s digital archiving of 
plaintiffs’ school papers for a software system designed to detect plagiarism was 
sufficiently transformative in purpose and use to constitute “fair use”).  But see UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting 
defendant’s contention that it was effecting a transformative use of “space shifting” by 
eliminating users’ needs for physical CD copies of their music collections). 
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infringement.  Most of these latter claims, however, will be 
avoided under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, as noted 
above.84 
C. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The DMCA, passed and signed into law in October 1998, 
codified two World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) 
treaties into United States law.  For purposes of this discussion, our 
focus is Title II, Limitations on Liability Relating to Material 
Online,85 codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512.  Section 512 limits liability 
for online service providers (“OSPs”) in certain circumstances.  It 
also includes procedures by which OSPs and ISPs can avail 
themselves of a “safe harbor” against liability for secondary 
copyright infringement.86  Section 512 limits the liability of service 
providers in four situations, if certain conditions are met.  Service 
providers are not liable: 
for infringement of copyright by reason of the 
provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing 
connections for, material through a system or 
network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider, or by reason of the intermediate and 
transient storage of that material in the course of 
such transmitting, routing, or providing 
connections.87 
This immunity is contingent on the service provider interacting 
with the material only to the extent absolutely necessary for the 
transmission to occur, by request of a third party to that third 
party’s designated recipients, and not storing copies of the material 
transmitted for longer than absolutely necessary.88  For the 
purposes of § 512(a)—describing transitory digital network 
communications—“service provider” is defined as “an entity 
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for 
digital online communications, between or among points specified 
 
 84 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 85 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. § 512(a). 
 88 Id. § 512(a)(1)–(5). 
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by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification 
to the content of the material as sent or received.”89  This definition 
encompasses ISPs, such as America Online and Comcast, in their 
traditional role of relaying digital packets from one server on the 
Internet to another.90 
For all other parts of § 512, a “service provider” is defined as 
“a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of 
facilities therefor” and includes all entities encompassed by the 
previous, narrower definition.91  Applications to which this broader 
definition applies include: 
System caching: Service providers generally are not 
liable as a result of “intermediate and temporary 
storage of material on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider. . . .” 92  This is an essential function in the 
provision of most online services and network 
access, so § 512(b) is largely protecting behavior 
that is needed for the Internet to operate. 
 
Information residing on systems or networks at 
direction of users (or, “Hosting” services93): 
Service providers generally are not liable as a result 
of “the storage at the direction of a user of material 
that resides on a system or network controlled or 
operated by or for the service provider . . . .”94  As 
will be discussed below, this subsection is of critical 
importance to Web 2.0 service providers whose 
business models rely on user-generated content.95  
These service providers must, however, be vigilant 
 
 89 Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).  
 90 See, e.g., JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: 
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE  42–44 (2005) 
(describing how packet-switched networks operate); see also POST, supra note 29, at 80–
89. 
 91 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).  
 92 Id. § 512(b).  
 93 CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.03, at 794 (6th ed. 2003). 
 94 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  
 95 See infra Part III.  
C04_MELZER_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2011  5:27 PM 
422 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:403 
in meeting the conditions set forth in § 512(c) and 
elsewhere in § 512 in order to avail themselves of 
the statutory safe harbor. 
 
Information location tools: Service providers 
generally are not liable for “referring or linking 
users to an online location containing infringing 
material or infringing activity, by using information 
location tools, including a directory, index, 
reference, pointer, or hypertext link . . . .”96  As with 
§ 512(b), subsection (d) serves largely to immunize 
a fundamental behavior of the Internet, and 
certainly of the World Wide Web, which is built on 
a system of links and pointers. 
Many of the recent cases in this area hinge on § 512 and 
service providers’ fidelity to its protections and conditions.97  As a 
threshold matter, none of the protections of § 512 are available to a 
service provider if it fails to comply with subsection (i): 
The limitations on liability established by this 
section shall apply to a service provider only if the 
service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably 
implemented, and informs subscribers and account 
holders of the service provider’s system or network 
of, a policy that provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider’s system or 
network who are repeat infringers.98 
While subsections (a) and (b) focus on purely technical 
behaviors and do not condition the immunity on lack of 
knowledge,99 subsections (c) and (d) require that the service 
 
 96 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).  
 97 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 75071 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010). 
 98 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).  
 99 See Id. § 512(a)–(b) (providing that liability limitations apply to service providers if 
certain acts/criteria are met ranging from the service provider not initiating the 
transmission to it not being involved with the selection of the transmission of infringing 
material, none of which expressly address immunity on the basis of lack of knowledge). 
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provider lack “actual knowledge” that the material or activity using 
the material is infringing.100  Subsection (d) codifies a combination 
of the contributory and vicarious liability standards discussed 
above: the service provider must lack actual or constructive 
knowledge, and also must not receive a direct financial benefit 
from the infringing material.101 
Subsection (c) features the more robust and better known 
“notice and takedown” procedures, with which service providers 
must comply to avail themselves of the “safe harbor.”  Addressing 
the operation of hosting services, subsection (c) requires that 
service providers designate an agent, who will receive all 
notifications of infringement directed to the service provider.102  
Failure to comply with this requirement in a timely fashion can 
cost a service provider its ability to rely on § 512 as a defense to 
secondary infringement liability.103  To be effective, the notice 
must comply with § 512(c)(3), and the provider must respond to an 
effective notice according to its policy, as discussed above, 
pursuant to § 512(i).104  The precise contours of these requirements 
and protections continue to play out in litigation, particularly 
where cloud computing services of one form or another are 
concerned. 
III. RECENT COPYRIGHT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CLOUD 
Having established the context in which questions of copyright 
enforcement in cloud computing are presented, we will now 
examine some recent cases that have confronted these issues and 
derive from them what we can expect from courts and relevant 
parties in the future. 
 
 100 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d) (expressly providing that service providers should not be 
liable if there is no actual knowledge or awareness of infringing material). 
 101 Id. § 512(d)(1)–(2). 
 102 Id. § 512(c)(2).  
 103 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C07-03952, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85266, at *23–24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (noting that “a 
service provider cannot be eligible for the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA until ‘the 
service provider has designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed 
infringement’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2))). 
 104 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). 
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Service providers have been availing themselves of the DMCA 
safe harbor provisions, found in § 512(c), for more than a 
decade.105  Some recent cases illustrate the current contours of the 
protection and the level of compliance necessary to take advantage 
of that protection.  The almost-defunct106 online video site, Veoh, 
recently won a trio of decisions upholding its § 512(c) defense 
against contributory infringement.107  Veoh’s service, which was 
substantially similar to Google’s YouTube,108 is effectively a video 
application using the SaaS model of cloud computing—users 
interact with the service through their web browser software, but 
the video processing all takes place on Veoh’s computers, using 
Veoh’s software.109 
 
 105 See, e.g., CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir. 2004); see 
also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009). 
 106 See, e.g., Ty McMahan, Veoh Lives On—Behind the Acquisition of the Video Site, 
WSJ.COM DIGITS BLOG (Apr. 8, 2010, 9:06 A.M.), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/ 
2010/04/08/veoh-lives-on-behind-the-acquisition-of-the-video-site (“It wasn’t technically 
Veoh Networks Inc.’s final hour, rather its final two hours, when a relatively unknown 
start-up with no revenue stepped in to acquire the heavily capitalized online video 
company.”); see also Antony Bruno, Veoh Closing Down, UMG Lawsuit Blamed, 
BILLBOARD.BIZ (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/ 
industry/e3i550e90cd48d89b8c0504928f5c1c244e (“Online video sharing site Veoh is 
going out of business. The AllThingsD blog says it cut the entire staff yesterday and a 
bankruptcy filing is expected soon.”); Peter Kafka, Universal Music Group Didn’t Help 
Veoh, but it Didn’t Kill it, ALLTHINGSDIGITAL: MEDIA MEMO (Feb. 11, 2010, 4:25 P.M.), 
http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20100211/universal-music-group-didnt-help-veoh-but-
it-didnt-kill-it (“The music label’s suit made it very difficult for Veoh to climb out of the 
deep hole it found itself in last year.  But it was the Web video start-up, not Universal, 
that dug that pit.”).  
 107 UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1118; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 108  See About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Oct. 
14, 2010) (“Founded in February 2005, YouTube is the world’s most popular online 
video community, allowing millions of people to discover, watch and share originally-
created videos. YouTube provides a forum for people to connect, inform, and inspire 
others across the globe and acts as a distribution platform for original content creators 
and advertisers large and small.”). 
 109 See Io Grp., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 (describing the automated uploading 
process used by Veoh, where, after a user would submit a video on Veoh’s website, 
Veoh’s systems would convert each video into Flash format and perform other automated 
tasks to make them searchable and available to other users). 
C04_MELZER_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2011  5:27 PM 
2011] COPYRIGHT IN THE CLOUD 425 
In the first of these three decisions, Io Group v. Veoh, the court 
found that Veoh complied with all of the requirements of § 512.110  
Io Group, an adult entertainment company, sought an infringement 
judgment against Veoh based on copyrighted adult videos that 
Veoh users had uploaded to the site.111  Rather than following the 
“notice and takedown” provisions of the DMCA, and engaging 
Veoh’s DMCA-compliant policy, Io Group provided Veoh with no 
notice of the infringing content prior to commencing its suit.112  By 
the time the suit was filed, however, Veoh had independently 
decided to remove all adult video content from its site, 
coincidentally including any content that formed the basis for Io 
Group’s infringement claims.113 
The court reviewed Veoh’s policies, both with respect to its 
user-facing terms of use and acceptable usage policy and with an 
eye towards DMCA compliance.114  After a step-by-step review of 
§ 512’s requirements, the court concluded that Veoh qualified for 
the safe harbor protections, despite Io Group’s attempts to chip 
away at Veoh’s policies and practices.115  The court also noted its 
displeasure with Io Group’s avoidance of the “notice and 
takedown” process, given Veoh’s apparent receptiveness to play 
within the DMCA’s rules.116 
The other decisions in Veoh’s favor came in a case brought by 
UMG Recordings, whose sound recordings and music 
compositions could be heard in videos, including UMG-produced 
 
 110 Id. at 1141. 
 111 Id. at 1136. 
 112 Id. at 1137. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 1137–38. 
 115 Id. at 1141–55.  The court considered and rejected Io Group’s argument that Veoh 
should fall outside of the safe harbor because of the apparent ease with which rogue users 
can regain access to the service after expulsion for infringement, which is a current 
source of tension in ongoing policy debates about copyright reform.  The court cited the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 
2007) for the proposition that the DMCA states, “A service provider reasonably 
implements its repeat infringer policy if it terminates users when ‘appropriate.’  Section 
512(i) itself does not clarify when it is ‘appropriate’ for service providers to act.  It only 
requires that a service provider terminate users who are ‘repeat infringers.’” (internal 
citation omitted). 
 116 Id. at 1148–50. 
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music videos, uploaded by third-party users to the Veoh service.117  
Veoh asserted its DMCA safe harbor defense, on the same grounds 
as it did in Io Group.118  In the first of the two relevant decisions in 
this case, UMG moved for summary judgment to block Veoh’s 
assertion of its DMCA defense.119  The court focused on the 
technical processes by which the videos were manipulated, stored 
and accessed using Veoh’s system.  In particular, the decision 
discussed four software functions, which UMG claimed pulled 
Veoh outside § 512’s protections: “(1) the reproduction of works 
through the creation of Flash versions of uploaded videos; (2) the 
reproduction of works through the creation of ‘chunked’ copies of 
uploaded videos; (3) the public performance of works when users 
access videos via streaming; (4) the distribution of works when 
users access videos via downloading.”120 
The court ultimately held that the limitations on liability found 
in § 512(c) apply to these software functions when they are 
employed for the purpose of facilitating access to user-stored 
material.121  The court accepted as correct Veoh’s argument, based 
in the language of § 512(c), that the statute presupposes that 
service providers will facilitate users’ access to the material and 
that the purpose of processing done by the service provider need 
not merely be storage.122  While this decision did not discuss 
“volitional conduct” in those terms, the analysis proceeds along 
similar lines.123  Veoh argued that § 512’s protections are not 
limited only to those functions that constitute storage at the user’s 
request, but also encompass those activities necessary to 
accomplish storage.124  The court agreed, holding that “the 
infringing conduct must occur as a result of the storage.”125  While 
 
 117 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1082 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
 118 Id. at 1091. 
 119 Id. at 1082. 
 120 Id. at 1088. 
 121 Id. at 1092 (“The four software functions that UMG challenges fall within the scope 
of § 512(c), because all of them are narrowly directed toward providing access to 
material stored at the direction of users.”). 
 122 Id. at 1088–89. 
 123 See Page, supra note 11 and accompanying text; Naone, supra note 12.  
 124 UMG Recordings, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. 
 125 Id. 
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this was a matter of statutory interpretation of the DMCA, rather 
than a broader reading of copyright, it follows that the distinction 
is whether Veoh’s actions stem directly—and automatically—from 
the user’s volitional conduct of either uploading a video for storage 
using Veoh’s infrastructure or accessing the video to view on 
Veoh’s system.126 
Having lost in its attempt to block Veoh’s DMCA safe harbor 
defense, UMG next tried to attack Veoh’s compliance, in much the 
same way as Io Group did.127  Indeed, the court here explicitly 
cited the Io Group holding, titling that section of its decision, 
“Prior Finding in Io Group that Veoh is entitled to the Section 
512(c) Safe Harbor.”128  As in Io Group, the court here addressed 
each component of the safe harbor step by step, finding at each 
point that Veoh was in compliance to the extent required by law.129 
However, in a recently filed appeal to the Ninth Circuit, UMG 
is challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment.130  
At the heart of the appeal is UMG’s argument that “the copyright 
rules that apply to online content companies like Veoh aren’t all 
that different from those that apply offline, regardless of what the 
DMCA says.”131  Much of the brief repeats the arguments rebuffed 
by Judge Matz in the district court and criticizes his decisions.132  
Additionally, UMG challenges the characterization of Veoh’s 
 
 126 The court said as much in its analysis:  
Common sense and widespread usage establish that “by reason of” 
means “as a result of” or “something that can be attributed to . . . .”  
So understood, when copyrighted content is displayed or distributed 
on Veoh it is “as a result of” or “attributable to” the fact that users 
uploaded the content to Veoh’s servers to be accessed by other 
means. 
Id. at 1089. 
 127 See id. at 1107; Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1154 
(N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 128 UMG Recordings, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. 
 129 Id. at 1105–1118. 
 130 Appellants’ Brief at 1, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 09-
56777, (9th Cir. June 17, 2010), 2010 WL 3706518 [hereinafter UMG Brief].   
 131 Joe Mullin, Not Dead Yet: Veoh’s Big Copyright Win Outlives Company, CORP. 
COUNSEL (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id= 
1202457430480; see also UMG Brief, supra note 130, at 45 (“The DMCA did not simply 
rewrite copyright law for the on-line world.” (citation omitted)). 
 132 See generally UMG Brief, supra note 130. 
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service as equivalent to a web hosting service.133  UMG’s brief 
tries to differentiate between a web host, via a browser request, 
serving material that it has stored at the direction of a user, and 
Veoh’s serving a video stored at the direction of a user,134 but does 
not appear to explain it in a way that actually distinguishes them.  
Veoh’s reply brief approvingly reviews the district court’s decision 
and works step by step through the DMCA safe harbor analysis.135  
This appeal deserves attention particularly because it is directed to 
the Ninth Circuit, headed by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, who has 
been vocal on Internet and intellectual property law issues.136 
The popular video-sharing site YouTube is in the midst of 
litigation137 substantially similar to Veoh’s ongoing dispute with 
UMG.  Content creator Viacom, and related companies, sued 
YouTube for copyright infringement based on the presence of 
user-uploaded copyrighted videos on the YouTube site.138  The 
parties recently engaged in a round of summary judgment motions 
focused on the DMCA safe harbor.139  Unsurprisingly, YouTube 
cited approvingly to the Veoh decisions, arguing that “[a]n 
unbroken line of cases, including recent decisions involving a 
video hosting service just like YouTube, confirms that Section 
512(c) bars such [infringement] claims.”140  Viacom criticized the 
Veoh decisions, but attempted to distinguish them nonetheless, 
 
 133 See id. at 43. 
 134 See id. at 43–44. 
 135 See generally Brief of Appellee, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 
09-56777, (9th Cir. June 19, 2010), 2010 WL 3706519. 
 136 See UMG Brief, supra note 130, at 45; see also Alex Kozinski & Josh Goldfoot, A 
Declaration of the Dependence of Cyberspace, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 365, 368 (2009) 
(discussing Ninth Circuit, and other, decisions regarding online copyright infringement).  
 137 Anne Broache & Greg Sandoval, Viacom Sues Google over Youtube Clips, CNET 
NEWS (Mar. 13, 2007, 2:14 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Viacom-sues-Google-over-
YouTube-clips/2100-1030_3-6166668.html. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Liability and Inapplicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe 
Harbor Defense, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
18, 2010) (No. 07-cv-02103), 2010 WL 1004561 [hereinafter Viacom Brief]; 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Viacom 
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010) (No. 07-cv-
02103), 2010 WL 1004562 [hereinafter YouTube Brief]. 
 140 YouTube Brief, supra note 139, at 19. 
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arguing that YouTube itself committed the infringement, so that 
the “right and ability to control” the activity of users is not the 
dispositive issue.141 
In a thirty-page decision issued in June 2010, Judge Louis 
Stanton granted summary judgment to YouTube as to all of 
Viacom’s claims for direct and secondary infringement, finding 
that “they qualify for the protection of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).”142  
Judge Stanton focused on the knowledge requirement found in § 
512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) and, reviewing the legislative history and 
recent intellectual property case law, concluded that YouTube did 
not have the requisite knowledge to void DMCA safe-harbor 
protection and that Viacom’s assertion of culpability by knowledge 
of “red flags” was not compatible with the statute.143  He also 
distinguished Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd.144 and held that peer-to-peer file-sharing networks are not 
covered by § 512(c), finding Viacom’s reliance on Grokster and its 
progeny faulty.145  Viacom has appealed and made public 
statements anticipating victory at the appellate level.146  Progress in 
this case and in the Veoh appeal could set up a Supreme Court 
showdown in the near future, perhaps clarifying certain elements 
of the DMCA’s safe harbor. 
While the legal lessons of the Veoh decisions thus far make it 
clear that most service providers, at least those falling under § 
512(k)(1)(B), can readily avoid liability by complying with § 512’s 
requirements, the broader lesson may not be as clear.  As a 
relatively small and non-essential service provider, Veoh was in a 
good position to manage its users and respond to takedown notices 
with the requisite speed and diligence to satisfy the safe harbor 
provisions.  It seems unlikely that a § 512(k)(1)(A) service 
provider—a traditional ISP—could operate quite so nimbly.  
Perhaps these services can address most of their needs within § 
 
 141 Viacom Brief, supra note 139, at 57–61. 
 142 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 143 See generally id. 
144  545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 145 Id. at 525–27. 
 146 Viacom-YouTube Litigation, VIACOM, INC., http://news.viacom.com/news/Pages/ 
youtubelitigation.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
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512(a), but many provide storage capabilities for their users, such 
as website hosting and backup file storage, opening them up to the 
protections, but also the requirements, of § 512(c).  Traditional 
ISPs, such as Comcast and Verizon, must be cautious to comply 
with notice-and-takedown procedures with respect to their hosting 
features lest they find themselves the subjects of secondary 
infringement actions.147 
A recent summary judgment decision148 against the owner of 
several BitTorrent websites stands in marked contrast to Veoh’s 
repeated victories.149  Applying the Grokster150 Court’s holdings 
on inducement, the court in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. 
 
 147 Comcast provides two gigabytes of storage to all high-speed Internet customers. 
High Speed Internet, COMCAST, http://security.comcast.net/constantguard (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2011).  Additionally, Comcast advertises its service as the “easier way to back 
up and share your valuable files.” Id.  Verizon offers residential customers “personal 
Web space,” with the ability to “build your own blog, business site or Web page.”  
Verizon High Speed Internet, VERIZON, http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/ 
HighSpeedInternet/Features/Features.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
 148 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL 
6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). 
 149 BitTorrent, as a protocol, provides its own challenges to copyright enforcement:   
BitTorrent is a protocol (a set of rules and description of how to do 
things) allowing you to download files quickly by allowing people 
downloading the file to upload (distribute) parts of it at the same 
time.  BitTorrent is often used for distribution of very large files, very 
popular files and files available for free, as it is a lot cheaper, faster 
and more efficient to distribute files using BitTorrent than a regular 
download. 
 What is BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/btusers/what-is-bittorrent 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010).  A recent census of files shared via BitTorrent found that about 
99% of files being shared were infringing copyrights. See, e.g., Ed Felten, Census of Files 
Available via BitTorrent, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Jan. 29, 2010, 10:45 AM), 
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/census-files-available-bittorrent (“Overall, 
we classified ten of the 1021 files, or approximately 1%, as likely non-infringing, this 
result should be interpreted with caution, as we may have missed some non-infringing 
files, and our sample is of files available, not files actually downloaded.  Still, the result 
suggests strongly that copyright infringement is widespread among BitTorrent users.”); 
see also Jacqui Cheng, BitTorrent Census: About 99% of Files Copyright Infringing, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 29, 2010, 1:08 PM), http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2010/01/ 
bittorrent-census-about-99-of-files-copyright-infringing.ars (“[A]lthough there are 
caveats to his findings, they highlight the relationship DRM has with illegal file sharing.  
As in: the more DRM there is on the legit versions of the content, the more popular it is 
on P2P.”). 
 150 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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Fung151 held that inducement to infringement would vitiate a § 512 
safe harbor defense: “inducement liability and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act safe harbors are inherently 
contradictory.”152  The court further held that Fung’s inducement 
obviated the need for a full explication of the contributory and 
vicarious liability tests.153  Here, the world of users was potentially 
larger and certainly more unruly than that which faced Veoh, but 
Fung’s affirmative conduct to induce and assist copyright 
infringement took him well outside the intended use of § 512’s 
safe harbors.154 
The Fung court stepped through the Grokster analysis, 
beginning by distinguishing the underlying technology: 
In a BitTorrent network . . . the download process is 
unique from that of previous systems such as 
Napster and Grokster. Rather than downloading a 
file from an individual user, users of a bit-torrent 
network will select the file that they wish to 
download, and, at that point, the downloading will 
begin from a number of host computers that possess 
the file simultaneously.155 
Another underlying distinction between Fung’s sites and the 
Grokster system is that a user did not search Fung’s sites for 
infringing files themselves, but rather for links to “dot-torrent” 
files that would then allow the user to begin downloading the 
sought-after file from multiple users.156 
 
 151 No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). 
 152 Id. at *18.  
 153 See id. at *15 (“Having determined that Defendants are liable under an inducement 
theory for their users’ infringing activities, the Court refrains from addressing Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the theories of material contributory infringement and 
vicarious infringement.”). 
 154 See id. at *5.  
 155 Id. at *2. 
 156 See id. at *2–3. 
The advantage of BitTorrent technology is the cumulative nature of 
its downloading and economies of scale.  As more users download a 
given file, there are more sources for the file pieces necessary for 
others.  This process, whereby individuals [may] be uploading and/or 
downloading from many sources at any given time is known as a 
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Moving on to its analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims, the court 
opted only to address the claim of inducement of copyright 
infringement, holding that “[d]efendants’ inducement liability is 
overwhelmingly clear.”157  Noting that material contribution to 
copyright infringement and inducement are collectively referred to 
as “contributory liability,”158 the court looked to Grokster to 
explain the distinction: “Generally, inducement requires that the 
defendant has undertaken purposeful acts aimed at assisting and 
encouraging others to infringe copyright,”159 while material 
contribution requires that the defendant “has actual knowledge that 
specific infringing material is available using its system.”160 
The theory of inducement, articulated in Justice Souter’s 
Grokster opinion, looks to both the intent and affirmative actions 
of the defendant to determine liability: “one who distributes a 
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by 
third parties.”161  Further, specific acts of infringement need not be 
proven to have been induced if a defendant’s overall objective is 
deemed “patently illegal” by a court.162  There is no exclusive basis 
for such an inference by the court,163 but rather the Grokster Court 
suggested several possible activities that could lead to this 
inference, including the classic instance of inducement by 
“advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed 
to stimulate others to commit violations.”164 
 
“swarm.”  This prevents a backlog of users waiting to download from 
one individual user with the source file. 
Id. 
 157 Id. at *6. 
 158 Id. at *7 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th 
Cir. 2007)). 
 159 Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *7 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005)). 
 160 Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *7 (citation omitted).  
 161 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37. 
 162 Id. at 941. 
 163 Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *10. 
 164 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937. 
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The Fung court found that plaintiffs had demonstrated several 
categories of inducement by defendants.165  Defendant Fung 
created a category and corresponding page on his IsoHunt site 
dedicated to “Box Office Movies,” encouraging users to identify 
BitTorrent files that would allow other users illegally to upload 
copies of the twenty highest-grossing films then playing in the 
United States.166  Defendants provided other browseable categories 
to ease the process for users looking for specific types of infringing 
content.167  Defendants argued that these lists either originated 
from users or were the result of “automated processes that simply 
reflect user activity.”168  Taking a different view of the volitional 
conduct issue than the court in Sony Corporation of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.,169 or the Second Circuit in Cartoon 
Network LP v. CSC Holdings,170 the Fung court held that: 
Defendants’ assertions ignore the material fact that 
Defendants designed the websites and included a 
feature that collects users’ most commonly 
searched-for titles.  The fact that these lists almost 
exclusively contained copyrighted works and that 
Defendants never removed these lists is probative of 
Defendants’ knowledge of ongoing infringement 
and failure to stop this infringement.171 
This activity by defendants stands in stark contrast to the 
“substantial noninfringing uses” found in Sony172 and Cartoon 
Network.173  As in Grokster,174 the Fung court found several 
 
 165 Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *11–15.  These categories, enumerated as section 
headings, include: “Defendants’ message to users,” “Defendants’ assistance to users 
engaging in infringement,” “Defendants’ implementation of technical features promoting 
copyright infringement,” “Defendants’ business model depends on massive infringing 
use,” and Defendants’ willful blindness (“[O]strich-like refusal to discover the extent to 
which its system was being used to infringe copyright”). Id. at *15. 
 166 Id. at *11. 
 167 Id.  
 168 Id. 
 169 464 U.S. 417, 437–38 (1984). 
 170 536 F.3d 121, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 171 Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *11. 
 172 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 173 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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instances of direct statements by Fung encouraging infringement, 
and attempting to justify it as a proper activity.175  The court also 
accepted evidence that Fung directly assisted users when they had 
difficulty locating or accessing infringing material.176  The 
defendants’ sites, like those in Grokster, were funded primarily by 
advertising revenue, and the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs 
clearly showed that the search for and acquisition of infringing 
content was the dominant reason for users to visit the sites and 
view the advertising.177 
The court then turned to the Fung defendants’ asserted DMCA 
defenses, focusing on § 512(d)’s “information location tools” 
provision.178  The court’s introduction to this section, while it did 
not bode well for defendants, is a helpful articulation of the 
DMCA: 
In many ways, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act is simply a restatement of the legal standards 
establishing secondary copyright infringement—in 
many cases, if a defendant is liable for secondary 
infringement, the defendant is not entitled to Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act immunity; if a defendant 
is not liable for secondary infringement, the 
defendant is entitled to Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act immunity.  The two sets of rules do 
not entirely overlap, but this framework is helpful 
 
 174 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937–40 
(2005). 
 175 Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *12. 
 176 Id.  The court also noted, briefly, that the statements themselves are not the 
prohibited activity, but rather serve as evidence of intent to induce. Id. at 13.  That said, 
the court cites authority that such statements are not protected by the First Amendment: 
“The first amendment does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply because the 
actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose.  Crimes . . . frequently involve the use of 
speech as part of the criminal transaction . . . .” Id. at *14 (quoting United States v. 
Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 177 Id. at *14–15.  The court rejected defendant’s contention that the lack of detail in 
plaintiffs’ evidence regarding advertising revenue precluded the use of this evidence, 
holding that, “the present Motion involves liability not damages, so such detail is 
unnecessary.” Id. at *15 n.25. 
 178 Id. at *15–18. 
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for understanding the Act’s statutory text and 
structure.179 
In short, the DMCA will be of little help to a defendant once 
inducement, or another basis for secondary copyright infringement, 
has been sufficiently proven.  As discussed above, a defendant’s 
knowledge and affirmative activities negate each required element 
of the safe harbor test. 
Summarizing its findings, the court held that the Fung 
defendants’ attempts to distinguish their case from Grokster 
failed.180  To the defendants’ claim that BitTorrent is different 
from the technologies at issue in Grokster, the court held that 
BitTorrent “is nothing more than old wine in a new bottle.”181  
Cloud computing providers and users should pay heed to this type 
of judicial pronouncement because it suggests that attempts to 
design a system intended to circumvent the hook of liability—
primary or secondary—could be thwarted if the court views the 
underlying elements as substantially similar to existing, reviewed 
technology or as having the same improper aims. 
Both sides in Viacom v. YouTube cited Fung in their summary 
judgment briefs for its discussion of inducement.  Viacom uses 
Fung at various points to support its application of the Grokster 
standards on inducement, a standard requiring less evidence of 
affirmative inducement, as a matter of law.182  YouTube makes a 
single reference to Fung as a narrative, factual example of 
prohibited conduct to illustrate the contrast with its own service.183  
 
 179 Id. at *15. 
 180 Id. at *19.  I will not review the court’s discussion of defendant’s second and third 
arguments—(2) that its activities were protected by the First Amendment and (3) that its 
users are located around the world and not just in the United States.  While I anticipate 
that many cloud computing defendants will appeal to the international nature of their user 
base, this argument is almost always undone by evidence of domestic infringement or 
domestic victims. 
 181 Id. To the extent it acknowledged a distinction in the technology, the court found 
BitTorrent more likely to result in liability.  “Defendants’ technologies appear to improve 
upon the previous technologies by permitting faster downloads of large files such as 
movies. Such an improvement quite obviously increases the potential for copyright 
infringement.” Id.  
 182 Viacom Brief, supra note 139, at 25–26, 47–48, 50, 52, 55, 57, 62. 
 183 YouTube Brief, supra note 139, at 83. 
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YouTube continues by arguing that Grokster stands for the 
proposition that courts should “reject[] inducement claims against 
services that were not designed intentionally to encourage 
copyright infringement, even if the services could be used for 
infringing purposes.”184  Courts have shown, and litigants accept, 
that both intention in system creation and design and ongoing 
operating conduct factor into an analysis of the DMCA safe 
harbor’s applicability.185  Those engaged in copyright reform 
efforts should consider this issue—how these lines are to be 
drawn—as ripe for clarification.  However, judicial application of 
these standards has been fairly consistent, as YouTube and Veoh 
have argued in court and in their briefs, thus far successfully.186 
Carelessness can also doom a service provider’s attempt to 
invoke the safe harbor defense.  A recent case involving a website 
hosting company illustrates what the failure to consider § 512 in a 
timely fashion can do to a defense.187  Defendant Akanoc failed to 
designate a § 512(c) agent until four months after the complaint in 
this case was filed, thus barring a safe harbor defense.188  
Additionally, though unsurprisingly, the court held that there was, 
at best, limited evidence of a DMCA compliance policy.189  While 
here, as with Veoh, the world of users was limited and reasonable 
steps could be taken to prevent infringement (or at the very least 
comply with § 512) it is unclear that the rule illustrated in Akanoc 
is readily scalable to major web hosts.  As policy discussions over 
copyright reform continue, a value judgment must be made at 
some level as to whether, and under what circumstances, copyright 
enforcement justifies stifling or disabling the functionality of key 
service providers. 
Moving away from the DMCA, Cablevision’s RS-DVR 
(remote storage-digital video recorder) provides an interesting look 
 
 184 Id. 
 185 See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Io 
Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 186 See supra note 168, at 28. 
 187 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1178 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010).   
 188 Id. at 1187. 
 189 Id. 
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at one deployment of cloud computing principles in a not-strictly-
computing method.  Cablevision was sued by television content 
owners for developing a system that allowed users to access 
television content stored remotely on centralized servers, operating 
as DVRs, owned and controlled by Cablevision.  The content 
owners ultimately lost and the circuit court decision provides an 
important reading of some of the key questions in cloud computing 
copyright jurisprudence: namely, whether an infringing copy is 
created by all technical processes, who is making the copy and 
whether liability arises from creating the instrumentality for the 
copy.190  Piggybacking off of the district court’s description of the 
RS-DVR system, the court noted that: 
“[T]he RS-DVR is not a single piece of equipment,” 
but rather “a complex system requiring numerous 
computers, processes, networks of cables, and 
facilities staffed by personnel twenty-four hours a 
day and seven days a week.”  To the customer, 
however, the processes of recording and playback 
on the RS-DVR are similar to that [sic] of a 
standard set-top DVR.  Using a remote control, the 
customer can record programming by selecting a 
program in advance from an on-screen guide, or by 
pressing the record button while viewing a given 
program.  A customer cannot, however, record the 
earlier portion of a program once it has begun.191 
At issue was whether Cablevision engaged in impermissible 
copying to operate the RS-DVR system.192 
The first question concerned the buffer data; to allow its 
subscribers to save programs to their respective RS-DVR accounts, 
 
 190 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied sub nom. Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 
(2009) (“Critically for our analysis here, plaintiffs alleged theories only of direct 
infringement, not contributory infringement, and defendants waived any defense based on 
fair use.”). 
 191 Id. at 125 (citations omitted). 
 192 Id. at 124. 
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Cablevision directed part of its programming stream into a buffer 
system.193   
“No bit of data remains in any buffer for more than 
a fleeting 1.2 seconds.  And unlike the data in cases 
like MAI Systems, which remained embodied in the 
computer’s RAM memory until the user turned the 
computer off, each bit of data here is rapidly and 
automatically overwritten as soon as it is 
processed.”194  
 Accordingly, the court held that the buffer data, while 
satisfying the embodiment prong of fixation under the Copyright 
Act, was not fixed for more than a transitory period, failing the 
duration requirement.195  This language appears to be protective of 
a service provider’s ability to conduct the underlying technical 
business of the Internet without fear of infringement liability, even 
where the claim is for direct infringement, not secondary.  ISPs 
could likely make out strong cases that any copying they do, for 
the purposes of conveying material to a customer or conveying that 
material to storage at the behest of a customer, is sufficiently 
fleeting to satisfy a fixation analysis as seen in Cartoon Network. 
This is essential to the smooth functioning of the Internet generally 
and cloud computing systems specifically. 
Addressing the issue of direct liability for the creation of 
playback copies, the court read Netcom as a proper gloss on § 106, 
rather than merely an expedient and/or outdated decision limited 
only to the Internet and ISP context.196  The court focused the issue 
by noting that there is a dispute as to the author of the allegedly 
infringing copy: Cablevision or the user.197  The court arrived at its 
answer by looking to the instances of volitional conduct that led to 
the creation of the copy: “There are only two instances of 
volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing, 
housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a 
copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 129–30. 
 195 Id. at 130. 
 196 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 197 Id. 
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a copy of a specific program.”198  Ultimately, the court analogized 
the RS-DVR to the VCR, holding that the customer’s conduct was 
the relevant volitional conduct in creating the copy.199 
This, too, is a green light for cloud computing service 
providers.  To the extent that service providers may be pursued for 
direct infringement, the Cartoon Network decision, echoing 
Netcom200 and Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.,201 stands for the proposition that system design, 
though it may lead to infringement, does not expose the provider or 
system designer to a direct infringement claim.  
IV. OUTLOOK 
Recent case law paints a fairly sunny picture for service 
providers in the cloud computing area.  So long as they operate 
responsibly, within the DMCA’s safe harbors, and avoid actively 
inducing infringement, their roles as intermediaries should not 
subject them to liability for copyright infringement.  Courts have 
applied this approach when reviewing the conduct of SaaS 
providers, such as Veoh, so the rule should apply all the more to 
PaaS and IaaS providers, who arguably have less direct interaction 
with and control over the content that their customers place on 
their systems, unless the provider induces infringement by its 
customers.202 
Of course, the corollary is the dark storm clouds that face 
content owners as cloud computing expands and more people 
continue putting more content into the cloud.  The DMCA and the 
case law interpreting it place the burden on the copyright owner to 
 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 201 464 U.S. 417, 437–38 (1984) (“In such cases, as in other situations in which the 
imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the ‘contributory’ infringer was in a 
position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use 
without permission from the copyright owner.  This case, however, plainly does not fall 
in that category.”). 
 202 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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identify and pursue infringement via the notice-and-takedown 
regime.203  Content owners have described that effort as 
“ultimately Sisyphean: because [these sites are] dynamic and 
change[] day-to-day or hour-to-hour as users upload more material, 
the task of identifying and sending notifications requesting the 
removal of copyrighted works would create an unending [version 
the children’s] game of ‘Whack-A-Mole.’”204  While judges, as 
individuals, may be sympathetic to this argument, current 
precedent and understanding of the DMCA suggests that this is the 
balance Congress knowingly struck.205 
While there are few bright lines in this area, service providers 
have a solid understanding of what the law requires of them at this 
point, and are therefore able to comply with the DMCA’s safe 
harbor provisions.  Content owners remain dissatisfied with the 
existing system, but do not lack options to pursue legal action 
against those directly responsible for infringement.206  That these 
options are unpopular with the industries’ consumers is not a 
matter for copyright law, though it suggests an attitude towards 
copyright in the digital age that should factor into discussions of 
reform. 
There are some possible changes on the horizon, in the form of 
proposed legislation and international agreements.  News of the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), a multilateral 
 
 203 See, e.g., supra notes 98, 109, 113. 
 204 UMG Brief, supra note 130, at 55.  
 205 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (reviewing 
the legislative history of the DMCA and finding that, “[t]he tenor of the foregoing 
provisions is that the phrases ‘actual knowledge that the material or an activity’ is 
infringing, and ‘facts or circumstances’ indicating infringing activity, describe knowledge 
of specific and identifiable infringements of particular individual items.  Mere knowledge 
of prevalence of such activity in general is not enough.”). 
 206 See Matt Richtel & Sharon Waxman, The Media Business, Film Studios Prepare 
Suits on Illegal Sharing of Files, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/ 
gst/fullpage.html?res=9905E2D8143CF936A35752C1A9629C8B63 (“Hollywood’s 
major movie studios said yesterday that they would begin filing lawsuits this month 
against people who make copyrighted films available for downloading over the 
Internet.”); Music Piracy Suit Against N.Y. Family Is Settled for $7,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/business/media/ 28piracy.html (“She was 
one of thousands of people sued in the Recording Industry Association of America’s 
antipiracy campaign . . . .”).  
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agreement that has been negotiated in secret over the last several 
years, started to leak to the public over the year,207 leading to a 
public disclosure by the negotiating parties of a draft text.208  
During the secret negotiations, one controversial provision that 
leaked to the public was a “three strikes” or “graduated response” 
policy whereby ISPs would be required to terminate the accounts 
of repeat offenders or face liability themselves, a departure from 
the DMCA framework discussed above.209 
The footnote containing this provision, supported by the United 
States and longed for by content owners and their representatives, 
is not present in the first publicly released draft, suggesting that it 
 
 207 See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Copyright Overreach Goes on World Tour, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 15, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/13/ 
AR2009111300852.html (“An international copyright agreement, negotiated under 
unusual secrecy, could impose a further round of restrictions on our use of digital 
technology.  This Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, or ACTA, represents an attempt 
by the United States and other countries to set common rules for violations of 
intellectual-property laws.  The United States hopes to use ACTA to export its laws, but 
in the process it might have to import others.”); Eric Pfanner, Quietly, Nations Grapple 
With Steps to Quash Fake Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, http://query.nytimes. 
com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E0DA1138F935A25751C0A9669D8B63 (“Behind a veil 
of secrecy, the United States, the European Union, Japan and other countries are forging 
ahead with plans to coordinate an international crackdown on illegally copied music, 
movies, designer bags and other goods that change hands in sidewalk souks and Internet 
bazaars.”).  
 208 CONSOLIDATED TEXT PREPARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029 
.pdf; see also Nate Anderson, ACTA Arrives (Still Bad, but a Tiny Bit Better), ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 21, 2010, 4:07 PM) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/ 
acta-is-here.ars [hereinafter ACTA Arrives] (“We’ve been covering the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) for two years now, and in that entire 24 month 
period no official text of the agreement has been released.  Remarkable, really, given the 
intense scrutiny, but there you have it.  Today, that all changed as the countries behind 
ACTA finally released a consolidated draft text of the agreement.”). 
 209 See, e.g., David Kravets, ACTA Draft: No Internet for Copyright Scofflaws, WIRED 
(Mar. 24, 2010) (citation omitted), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/terminate-
copyright-scofflaws (“The specific ISP policy suggested in a footnote ‘is providing for 
the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscriptions and accounts on the service 
provider’s system or network of repeat infringers.’ This so-called ‘three strikes’ or 
‘graduated response’ policy, is the holy grail of Internet-copyright enforcement, 
staunchly backed by the Motion Picture Association of America and the Recording 
Industry Association of America.”). 
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is no longer being considered by the negotiators.210  Shortly before 
the release of the draft, the European Parliament approved a 
resolution stating that it would not support ACTA if it contained 
this type of provision.211  A provision like this, which called for 
“the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscriptions and 
accounts on the service provider’s system or network of repeat 
infringers,” would create another liability hook to be used against 
ISPs, as failure to terminate repeat offenders would be grounds for 
liability in itself.212  The absence of such a provision suggests that, 
for the time being, the rules set out in Veoh and Fung regarding 
inducement and proper compliance with § 512 will continue to set 
the boundaries of the DMCA safe harbor.  There is also some 
evidence that stricter policing of and by ISPs through the 
imposition of a three-strikes law will not be effective in reducing 
infringement.213 
As a domestic matter, Congress created a new executive 
position, the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator (IPEC) under the Office of Management and Budget, 
as part of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for 
Intellectual Property Act of 2008.214  The first IPEC, Victoria 
Espinel, was appointed in the fall of 2009, and is currently engaged 
in a public comment period on the issue of “Coordination and 
Strategic Planning of the Federal Effort Against Intellectual 
 
 210 ACTA Arrives, supra note 207 (“An earlier footnote found in a leaked draft provided 
a single example of such a policy: ‘Providing for termination in appropriate 
circumstances of subscriptions and accounts in the service provider’s system or network 
of repeat infringers.’  In other words, some variation of ‘three strikes.’  That footnote is 
now gone from the text entirely.”). 
 211 See, e.g., David Kravets, ACTA Backs Away from 3 Strikes, WIRED (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/acta-treaty.  
 212 Id. 
 213 Nate Anderson, Piracy up in France After Tough Three-Strikes Law Passed, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 26, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/03/piracy-up-
in-france-after-tough-three-strikes-law-passed.ars (“According to a team of French 
researchers, online copyright infringement is down on P2P networks—but it’s up in areas 
that the law doesn’t cover, such as online streaming and one-click download services like 
Rapidshare.”). 
 214 Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/intellectualproperty (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2010). 
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Property Infringement.”215  The Center for Democracy and 
Technology, an Internet civil liberties group, submitted comments 
with a partial focus on the issue of intermediary liability: 
Our comments also urge the IPEC to resist calls to 
enlist ISPs in online copyright enforcement. 
Congress—in the DMCA and Section 230—has 
expressly rejected the notion that ISPs should be 
responsible for policing user behavior.  This policy 
has led to an explosion of innovative services, and it 
should not be undercut by—to name two 
increasingly popular examples—“three strikes” or 
filtering mandates.216 
It is, at this point, unclear what will come out of the IPEC’s 
public comment collection and what her next steps will be.  As 
noted above, the removal of the “three-strikes” footnote from the 
ACTA draft, and the European Parliament’s declared objection to 
it, suggests that this provision is probably dead for the time being.  
The IPEC could promote a revision of the DMCA that includes a 
version of this provision to operate only domestically, though there 
is no evidence to suggest that such a revision is likely.  Cloud 
service providers should keep an eye on this process as it unfolds. 
Another proposal under discussion is the Copyright Reform 
Act (“CRA”), championed by Public Knowledge, a “public interest 
organization that works to protect the rights of citizens and 
consumers to communicate and innovate in the digital age.”217  
The CRA is being developed in five parts, the first of which, 
addressing fair use, was recently released.218  Overall, the CRA 
aims to:  
 
 215 Coordination and Strategic Planning of the Federal Effort Against Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 75 Fed. Reg. 8137 (Feb. 23, 2010). 
 216 Andrew McDiarmid, CDT Urges IP Czar to Focus on Bad Actors, Not 
Intermediaries, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (Mar. 25, 2010, 1:31 PM), 
http://www.cdt.org/blogs/andrew-mcdiarmid/cdt-urges-ip-czar-focus-bad-actors-not-
intermediaries.  
 217 Jennifer M. Urban, REPORT 1 UPDATING FAIR USE FOR INNOVATORS AND CREATORS 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE: TWO TARGETED REFORMS, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 1 (Feb. 13, 2010), 
http://publicknowledge.org/pdf/fair-use-report-02132010.pdf. 
 218 Id.  Public Knowledge summarized its fair use proposal as proposing to “extend[] the 
list of explicitly favored uses in the preamble to section 107 of the Copyright Act to 
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1. strengthen fair use, including reforming 
outrageously high statutory damages, which 
deter innovation and creativity;  
2. reform the DMCA to permit circumvention of 
digital locks for lawful purposes;  
3. update the limitations and exceptions to 
copyright protection to better conform with how 
digital technologies work;  
4. provide recourse for people and companies who 
are recklessly accused of copyright infringement 
and who are recklessly sent improper DMCA 
take-down notices; and  
5. streamline arcane music licensing laws to 
encourage new and better business models for 
selling music.219 
On the whole, the proposals of the CRA occupy the opposite 
end of the spectrum from ACTA: generally loosening copyright 
liability to better accommodate the actual, modern usage of 
technology and content.  At present it is unclear whether the CRA 
and its advocates will play a direct role in the revision and 
adaptation of copyright laws in the near-term, or whether the CRA 
will merely occupy the time and attention of some members of the 
academy in coming years.  Interestingly, the proposals in the CRA 
seek to redefine the scope of copyright itself, not to create an 
enforcement regime like § 512.  Movement towards this type of 
reform would make policing more difficult for content owners 
because it would change the terms of what they own. 
A present example can be seen in the role of “fair use” in 
current litigation involving YouTube.  In a Summary Judgment 
memorandum, YouTube argues that:  
[b]ecause neither the fair use (nor the de minimis 
use) of a copyrighted work is an infringement, any 
 
include incidental uses, non-consumptive uses, and uses that are both personal and non-
commercial.” Pan C. Lee, Daniel S. Park, Allen W. Wang & Jennifer M. Urban, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE COPYRIGHT REFORM ACT, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 8 (Feb. 13, 2010), 
http://publicknowledge.org/pdf/cra-introduction-02132010.pdf.  
 219 Public Knowledge Proposes New Copyright Reform Act, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 15, 
2010), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2906 (internal citations omitted). 
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clip for which there is even a debatable claim of fair 
use is not one that YouTube had any obligation 
under the DMCA to unilaterally remove.  A service 
provider cannot lose its safe harbor simply because 
it might err in making what are often complex or 
difficult fair-use determinations.220   
If content owners argue, as UMG and Viacom have, that 
service providers should police their services for infringing 
content, YouTube’s argument—that fair use and de minimis 
copying obfuscate claims of infringement making unilateral 
determinations difficult if not impossible—effectively counters the 
implication of a duty.  If the CRA successfully broadens the 
definition of fair use, or otherwise alters the scope of copyright, 
YouTube’s argument is only bolstered by the increase in content 
that may, on its face, appear to be infringing, but, as a matter of 
law, is not. 
None of these reform efforts fully engage the question of 
whether the relevant technology has changed sufficiently since 
1998 to require a reexamination of the DMCA.  One of the issues 
at the heart of both the Veoh and YouTube litigations is the 
characterization of the respective defendants’ systems.221  We can 
fairly say that in 1998 the prospect of a YouTube-style system 
would be unfamiliar to most people, and certainly to members of 
Congress.  Accordingly, we have no assurance as to whether 
Congress might have drafted the DMCA differently if, as UMG 
argues, the safe harbor was only intended to protect websites, of 
the variety common in 1998, and not interactive sites such as 
YouTube.com.222  More generally speaking, Web 2.0 services have 
operated entirely under the aegis of the DMCA’s provisions, 
especially its safe harbor, and thus far courts have condoned 
DMCA-compliant behavior.223 
The system designed by Cablevision, at issue in Cartoon 
Network, is another example of technological convergence that 
 
 220 YouTube Brief, supra note 139, at 53. 
 221 See supra notes 133–44 and accompanying text. 
 222 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91 
(C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 223 See, e.g., id. at 1083. 
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challenges the definitions drafted to support the DMCA.224  
Broadly, the prospect of full-quality television transmitted using 
the same Internet protocol that enabled the web was a foreign 
concept in 1998.  While the trend of judicial decisions suggests 
that reevaluation and revision are not imminently needed, they 
raise the question of how long the underlying structure of the 
DMCA can last before it becomes as obsolete as the computers of 
the late 20th century. 
CONCLUSION 
With current reform efforts all in their early stages, we must 
look to existing statutes and judicial interpretations to assess the 
near-term viability of copyright enforcement in the cloud.  Barring 
significant judicial departure from the rules applied in Veoh, 
YouTube, Fung, and Cartoon Network—rules based in large 
measure on Grokster and Netcom—the challenge lies with content 
owners to devise a means to better protect their rights.  The 
situation is not as bleak as copyright owners make it out to be.  The 
music industry has survived the creation of the mp3 format,225 and 
has bested Napster and Grokster,226 leading to greater innovation in 
the industry’s business model.  The movie industry is similarly 
poised to thrive, striking down the most egregious Internet pirates 
and using the same technology to advance its content delivery 
systems.227  The last decade has shown us that those who play by 
the rules—those of copyright law generally and the DMCA in 
particular—on both sides of the field benefit.  Those, like Fung, 
who blatantly violate rights, and aid and abet infringement by 
others will face the consequences, just as those, like UMG, who 
 
 224 See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127–29 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 225 See Steven Seidenberg, The Record Business Blues, A.B.A.J. (June 1, 2010, 4:20 
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_record_business_blues. 
 226 See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 227 See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913; see also Eric Pfanner, Four Convicted in 
Sweden in Internet Piracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/04/18/business/global/18pirate.html. 
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flout the established system to pursue a more aggressive one may 
find themselves out in the cold. 
Attempts to hook ISPs with greater liability and responsibility 
would disrupt the existing Internet ecosystem to a degree that 
could stifle overall progress for the sake of protecting mostly large-
scale content owners, an effort that is unlikely to succeed in the 
long run.  The CRA proposals may go too far towards attempting 
to codify the notion of Internet exceptionalism228 in ways it has not 
previously been codified, but the CRA does benefit from being 
responsive to actual conditions, as compared with ACTA’s behind-
the-eight-ball attempts to over-police an area of control that has 
clearly slipped away from rights holders.  While partisans on each 
side of this debate insist that a new system is necessary, the status 
quo regime, combining statutes and judicial precedent, has proven 
remarkably adaptable to the changes in the ways that Internet 
technologies are applied.  Large-scale reforms, at present, appear 
both unnecessary and more likely to cause harm than to bring 
about improvements. 
 
 228 Peter Margulies, The Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, 
and the First Amendment, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2004/04_041207_margulies.php 
(“Many prominent commentators embrace a view we can call ‘Internet 
Exceptionalism,’ which stresses distinctions between the Internet and earlier 
communications media such as books, newspapers, and broadcasts.  Internet 
Exceptionalists cite a variety of the Internet’s attributes, centering on the same 
simultaneity and absence of mediation that preoccupied courts and 
commentators with regard to previous technological innovations. For example, 
Internet Exceptionalists note how the Internet enhances consumers’ ability to 
assemble an individualized collage of information from a variety of specialized 
and partisan sources, without the intercession of an intermediary, such as an 
editor, who may offer a broader perspective.”). 
